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PAYING FOR UNAPPROVED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 
KELLY MCBRIDE FOLKERS,† ALISON BATEMAN-
HOUSE,†† & CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON††† 
 
his symposium article examines the use of investigational (un-
approved) medical products in the United States, with particu-
lar focus on who pays for this use. In the United States, the 
question of who pays for the use of approved medical products for 
their intended indications is complicated enough, with some ex-
penses borne by private payers, some by public payers, some cov-
ered as charity care, and some paid out of pocket by patients.1 A 
separate question is off-label use, in which an approved medical 
product is used for an unapproved indication.2 In this article, we 
focus on a narrower issue: what entities in the United States pay for 
access to unapproved medical products, e.g., investigational drugs, 
devices, or diagnostics that have not (yet) received Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approval.  
We examine the various forms of preapproval access 
(“PAA”) to experimental medical products available in the United 
States—clinical trials and non-trial preapproval access via the Ex-
panded Access (“EA”) and Right to Try (“RTT”) pathways. For each, 
this paper analyzes which entity—individual, insurer, sponsor, or 
 
  † Senior Research Associate, Division of Medical Ethics, NYU Grossman School of 
Medicine. 
  †† Assistant Professor, Division of Medical Ethics, NYU Grossman School of Med-
icine and co-chair NYU Grossman School of Medicine Working Group on Compassionate 
Use and Preapproval Access (CUPA). 
  ††† N. Neal Pike Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University, and affiliate 
with the NYU Grossman School of Medicine Working Group on Compassionate Use and 
Pre-Approval Access (CUPA). This work was largely done while at University of Arizona, 
and with the excellent research assistance of Andrea Sharp and the administrative support 
of Bert Skye. 
 1. COMM. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., HIDDEN COSTS, VALUES LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 38 (2003), http://www. 
nap.edu/catalog/10719.html. 
 2. Off-Label Drug Use, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treat-
ments-and-side-effects/treatment-types/off-label-drug-use.html (last revised Mar. 17, 2015). 
T 
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other—bears the cost and what limitations or caps, if any, exist on 
these costs. This paper considers various proposed novel payment 
mechanisms that may permit more equitable use of investigational 
medical products. 
This analysis grapples with the ongoing tension between the 
desire to make access widely available to those for whom such prod-
ucts provide a last hope and the concern that allowing the purchase 
of unapproved medical products in the same manner as approved 
medical products likely would have negative consequences for indi-
vidual patients, public health, payers, and those who support payers 
through premiums and taxes, in a healthcare system already grap-
pling with scarcity and inequity.3  
The vast majority of treatments-in-development ultimately 
do not receive regulatory approval because they are determined via 
clinical trials to be unsafe and/or ineffective.4 Thus, the issue of 
paying for investigational medical products is intertwined with both 
the risk of harm to patients, which in turn can lead to expensive 
follow-up care, and the risk of wasteful expenditure on products 
that simply do not work.5 Moreover, in a world of scarce resources, 
it must be decided to what extent access to investigational medical 
products is a priority worthy of the subsequent opportunity costs. 
Also, if manufacturers are allowed to profit indefinitely from unap-
proved products without completing the pivotal trials necessary to 
gain marketing authorization, the medical, payer, and patient com-
munities may never learn whether the product is safe, effective, or 
worth its price.6 This has implications as well for future treatments, 
which would likely be tested against the unproven product, a prac-
tice that has become standard of care in light of the lack of other 
options. 
Part I outlines payment-related disparities in access in-
grained in the current United States healthcare system. Part II fo-
cuses on access in the context of clinical trials, which most payers 
 
 3. Unapproved Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 29, 2020), https:// 
www.fda.gov/drugs/enforcement-activities-fda/unapproved-drugs. 
 4. Joseph DiMasi, Pharmaceutical R&D Performance by Firm Size: Approval Success Rates 
and Economic Returns, 21 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 26, 26 (2014). 
 5. Gail A. Van Norman, Expanding Patient Access to Investigational Drugs: Single Patient 
Investigational New Drug and the “Right to Try”, 3 J. AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY 280, 288 (2018). 
 6. See Christopher Robertson & Victor Laurion, Tip of the Iceberg II: How the Intended-
Uses Principle Produces Medical Knowledge and Protects Liberty, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 770 
(2017). 
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have begun to cover, but where remaining uncovered expenses can 
disincentivize participation in clinical trials, even among those 
highly motivated to enroll. Part III discusses non-trial preapproval 
access pathways, specifically Expanded Access and Right to Try, 
where coverage is scant. Part IV briefly deals with investigational 
products (such as stem cell treatments) that are available via unreg-
ulated or underregulated direct-to-consumer sales. Part V then re-
views the ethical considerations inherent in paying for investiga-
tional medical products. 
I. THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SETTING 
In the United States, prior to broad release of a new medical 
product, a manufacturer must produce a reasonable amount of ev-
idence about the product’s safety and efficacy and secure approval 
by the FDA.7 Thus, “unapproved” or “investigational” refers to prod-
ucts that the FDA has not approved for prescription, sale, and mar-
keting. In most circumstances, patients access such medical prod-
ucts by participating in clinical trials.8  
However, for severely ill patients who are unable to join clin-
ical trials and who have no other treatment options, use of these 
products is available through a variety of access programs in many 
countries.9 These programs vary in detail, and they utilize different 
terminologies, e.g., Expanded Access or Right to Try in the United 
States; Special Access Program in Canada; and Temporary Author-
isation for Use in France, among others.10 Regardless of the termi-
nologies, these mechanisms share a common goal of permitting se-
riously or terminally ill patients with no other therapeutic options 
to use unapproved medical products in hopes of potential thera-
peutic benefit.11  
 
 7. Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Pro-
motion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 547 (2014). 
 8. Compassionate Drug Use, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/trea 
tment/treatments-and-side-effects/clinical-trials/compassionate-drug-use.html (last re-
vised Nov. 19, 2018). 
 9. Id. 
 10. VANESSA PLATE, THE IMPACT OF OFF-LABEL, COMPASSIONATE AND UNLICENSED 
USE ON HEALTH CARE LAWS IN PRESELECTED COUNTRIES 34 (2010). 
 11. See Gayarthri Balasubramanian et al., An Overview of Compassionate Use Programs in 
the European Union Member States, 5 INTRACTABLE & RARE DISEASES RES. 244 (2016) (explain-
ing programs in European Union member countries that allow patients to access drugs 
without participating in clinical trials); Jonathan Jarow et al., Overview of FDA’s Expanded 
Access Program for Investigational Drugs, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 177 (2017) 
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Patient demand for investigational medical products in the 
United States has increased in the last several years, likely in re-
sponse to heightened media and political attention to the topic, 
coupled with widespread frustrations about access to medicines 
even after regulatory approval and longstanding perceptions by 
some that drug development is too slow and insufficiently patient-
centric.12 
We focus on the United States, where access to healthcare is 
fundamentally unequitable. For example, recent news reports de-
tail situations in which patients have been denied transplants due 
to concerns that they cannot afford post-transplant medications 
necessary to prevent rejection of the donated organ;13 patients are 
unable to afford the ongoing expense of insulin and ration it at the 
risk of death or other preventable harm;14 and patients are dis-
charged even though continued hospitalization is warranted.15  
Healthcare coverage in the United States is fragmented, 
with the largest group of Americans insured through their employ-
ers’ contracts with private payers.16 Americans who receive publicly-
funded insurance do so primarily through two programs: Medicare 
(intended primarily for individuals over the age of sixty-five) and 
Medicaid (intended primarily for low-income individuals).17  
There have been numerous proposals for achieving univer-
sal insurance coverage, either through a single-payer system or a 
 
(describing the FDA’s Expanded Access program, which allows patients to access unap-
proved drugs without participating in clinical trials); Laura L. Kimberly et al., Pre-approval 
Access Terminology: A Cause for Confusion and a Danger to Patients, 51 THERAPEUTIC 
INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 494 (2017) (clarifying terms); Eline M. Bunnik et al., Little to Lose 
and No Other Options: Ethical Issues in Efforts to Facilitate Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs, 
122 HEALTH POL’Y 977 (2018) (surveying issues). 
 12. Kelly Folkers et al., Federal Right to Try: Where is it Going?, 49 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 
26, 29 (2019). 
 13. JoNel Aleccia, No Cash, No Heart. Transplant Centers Require Proof of Payment, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018), https://khn.org/news/no-cash-no-heart-transplant-centers-
require-proof-of-payment. 
 14. Ed Silverman, One-Quarter of People with Diabetes in the U.S. are Rationing Their Insu-
lin, STATNEWS (June 18, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2019/06/18/one-
quarter-of-people-with-diabetes-in-the-u-s-are-rationing-their-insulin. 
 15. MARTIN CASTRO ET AL., U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PATIENT DUMPING iv (2014), 
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/2014PATDUMPOSD_9282014-1.pdf. 
 16. EDWARD R. BERCHICK ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2017 2 (2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/li-
brary/publications/2018/demo/p60-264.pdf. 
 17. James McWhinney, Medicare vs. Medicaid: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 
15, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/07/medicare-vs-medicaid.asp. 
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public option.18 Yet, even with recent increases in coverage, many 
Americans remain uninsured or underinsured.19 According to the 
most recent data issued by the United States Census Bureau in 2017, 
approximately 28.5 million individuals remain uninsured.20 Ap-
proximately 43.8 million individuals are underinsured, meaning 
their insurance plans are inadequate to cover the medical products 
and services they need.21 Instances in which insured patients are de-
nied access to high-cost, but approved, treatments, such as gene 
therapies, have increasingly come to light.22 Thus, access to unap-
proved products, where safety and efficacy have not been proven, 
must be seen in the light of these broader scarcities and inequities.23 
II. CLINICAL TRIALS 
Clinical trials are studies of interventions to ascertain relia-
ble information about their safety and efficacy in treating a particu-
lar indication.24 Human trials of new medical products proceed 
through three phases, from small studies to determine appropriate 
dosage levels, to larger, often randomized, studies of patients with 
the disease needing treatment.25 In some Phase I studies, research 
subjects are healthy volunteers, and their participation is typically 
financially compensated.26 But for most trials, participants are 
 
 18. Margot Sanger-Katz, The Difference Between a ‘Public Option’ and ‘Medicare for All’? 
Let’s Define our Terms, THE N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/02/19/upshot/medicare-for-all-health-terms-sanders.html. 
 19. BERCHICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 1. 
 20. Id. at 1. 
 21. Sara R. Collins et al., Health Insurance Coverage Eight Years After the ACA, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/ publica-
tions/issue-briefs/2019/feb/health-insurance-coverage-eight-years-after-aca. See generally 
CHRISTOPHER T. ROBERTSON, EXPOSED: WHY OUR HEALTH INSURANCE IS INCOMPLETE AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2019). 
 22. James Paton, Gene Therapy Was Hailed as a Revolution. Then Came the Bill, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-
07/gene-therapy-was-hailed-as-a-revolution-then-came-the-bill. 
 23. Holly Fernandez Lynch & Alison Bateman-House, Facilitating Both Evidence and Ac-
cess: Improving FDA’s Accelerated Approval and Expanded Access Pathways, 48 J.L Med. & Ethics 
365 (2020).  
 24. Clinical Trials: What are Clinical Trials and Studies?, NAT’L INST. ON AGING (Apr. 9, 
2020), https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/what-are-clinical-trials-and-studies. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
ROBERTSON_TOPUBLISH (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/20208:00 PM 
90          WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY      [Vol. 11:1 
patients who fit the eligibility criteria of a specific study with regard 
to disease or condition.27  
Patients sometimes view participation in a clinical trial as a 
way to receive medical treatment;28 however, the primary intent of 
clinical research is to learn about a new medical product and to 
evaluate its safety and efficacy in a specific patient population, ra-
ther than to provide treatment.29 Even in the case of a negative find-
ing, the trial contributes to scientific knowledge, provided the trial 
data and results are made public. This mix of possible individual 
benefit and societal benefit plays a role in how clinical trial-related 
expenses will be covered.30 
A. Sponsors 
In the United States, pharmaceutical or biotechnology com-
panies sponsor the majority of clinical trials.31 The trial sponsor of-
ten covers the costs of the investigational product and trial-required 
interventions and makes them available free of charge to the re-
search subject/patient.32 The sponsor’s trial budget includes the 
provider and facilities fees for study-required visits or tests, along 
with any incentive payments or reimbursements trial participants 
may receive.33 However, not all clinical trials involve experimental 
agents. A trial might test various approved drugs or combinations 
of approved drugs; in these cases, patients’ insurers may pay costs 
the sponsor does not cover, as use of these drugs is part of standard 
medical care, despite their delivery in the context of a trial.34 Ex-
penses resulting from the trial that are not part of the trial 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Paying for Clinical Trials, ONCOLINK (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.onco-
link.org/cancer-treatment/clinical-trials/paying-for-clinical-trials. 
 31. Michelle Llamas, Big Pharma’s Role in Clinical Trials, DRUGWATCH (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.drugwatch.com/featured/clinical-trials-and-hidden-data. 
 32. Clinical Trials: Sponsors and Sponsor-investigators, MARS (Oct. 17, 2012), 
https://learn.marsdd.com/article/clinical-trials-sponsors-and-sponsor-investigators. 
 33. Kunal Sampat, Ultimate Guide to Clinical Trial Costs, CLINICAL TRIAL PODCAST (Jan. 
21, 2017), https://clinicaltrialpodcast.com/ultimate-guide-to-clinical-trial-costs. 
 34. Insurance Coverage of Clinical Trials, AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, 
https://www.asco.org/research-guidelines/clinical-trials/insurance-coverage-clinical-trials 
(last visited June 12, 2020). 
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protocol—for example, research-related injuries—are handled in-
consistently.35 
Aside from what sponsors may pay, another question is what 
they may charge patients for participation in a clinical trial. Since 
1987, clinical trial sponsors have been permitted to charge patients 
for the provision of investigational medical products provided un-
der an investigational new drug application (“IND”), but these costs 
can only include direct costs of manufacturing, shipping, and/or 
handling.36  
Sponsors of INDs must request authorization from the FDA 
to charge for the use of an investigational medical product under 
that IND.37 The FDA subsequently determines whether the sponsor 
may charge, but the agency does not determine how to carry out this 
charging.38 Specifically for clinical trials, sponsors must provide ev-
idence to the FDA that the investigational medical product under 
its IND has potential clinical benefit that, if demonstrated, would 
provide significant advantages for patients; that the data obtained 
from the trial is necessary for the product’s approval submission 
and/or label expansion; and that the sponsor cannot conduct the 
clinical trial without charging.39 The sponsor must also provide a 
document to the FDA that supports its calculation for cost recovery, 
and an independent certified public accountant must verify the ac-
curacy of the calculations.40 Finally, sponsors can charge for 
 
 35. Carolyn Riley Chapman et al., The Quest for Compensation for Research-Related Injury 
in the United States: A New Proposal, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 732, 732 (2019). 
 36. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., CHARGING FOR 
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS UNDER AN IND — QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY 8 (June 2016) https://www.fda.gov/media/85682/download [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY]. Under federal law, investigational new drugs cannot be shipped 
across state lines. Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
(Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/investigational-new-drug-
ind-application. Since sponsors of clinical trials will likely want to ship their product across 
state lines for the purposes of setting up additional trial sites, they must apply for an exemp-
tion to this federal requirement. Id. An investigational new drug application (IND) allows 
sponsors to ship investigational medical products across state lines and serves as a legal ex-
emption to the federal regulations surrounding interstate commerce of investigational 
medical products. Id. 
 37. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 2. 
 38. Id. at 3. For example, a sponsor may contract with a third party or contract re-
search organization that administers the trial or expanded access program. In this case, the 
FDA does not have authority to determine how that third party carries out charging pa-
tients. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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“extraordinary costs” if there are such factors like manufacturing 
complexity, scarcity of a necessary natural resource needed to pro-
duce the investigational medical product, a large quantity of prod-
uct needed, or some combination of these circumstances.41 
More recently, there has been a gradual introduction of so-
called “pay-to-play” (or, more neutrally, “participant-funded”) tri-
als, in which the trial-related costs are borne by the research par-
ticipant instead of a sponsor.42 The U.S. Health and Human Ser-
vices Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research 
Protections (“SACHRP”) recently released a series of recommen-
dations on pay-to-play studies.43 These recommendations sug-
gested that sponsors avoid charging participants but provide guid-
ance and ethical considerations for doing so when there are 
legitimate reasons.44 Others have commented on the ethical per-
missibility, or in some cases obligation, to reimburse and/or com-
pensate clinical trial participants for completing a study.45 
B. Patients/Caregivers 
While most clinical trials provide investigational medicines 
for free, some may charge patients for ancillary costs, including of-
fice visits, lab tests, and imaging, which the patients’ insurance—if 
they are insured—may or may not cover.46 Patients or their caregiv-
ers may incur trial-related expenses, particularly for such costs as 
travel, parking, lodging, childcare, etc.47 These issues have received 
increased attention in recent years. SACHRP produced guidance 
clarifying that such payments are ethically appropriate and do not 
 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Rebecca Robbins, Amid Rising Concern, Pay-to-Play Clinical Trials are Drawing Federal 
Scrutiny, STATNEWS (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/08/06/amid-rising-
concern-pay-to-play-clinical-trials-are-drawing-federal-scrutiny. 
 43. Attachment A - Addressing Ethical Concerns Regarding Offers of Payment to Research Par-
ticipants, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/attach-
ment-a-september-30-2019/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 2019). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Emily Largent & Holly Fernandez Lynch, Paying Research Participants: The Outsized 
Influence of “Undue Influence”, 39 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1, 1 (2017). 
 46. Insurance Coverage and Clinical Trials, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/clinical-trials/paying/insurance. 
 47. Anna Lee, Kanan Shah & Fumiko Chino, Assessment of Parking Fees at National Can-
cer Institute–Designated Cancer Treatment Centers, JAMA ONCOLOGY (forthcoming 2020); Cal-
culating the Costs of Clinical Trials, ASH CLINICAL NEWS (Dec. 1, 2019), https://www.ashclini-
calnews.org/spotlight/feature-articles/calculating-costs-clinical-trials. 
ROBERTSON_TOPUBLISH (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2020  8:03 PM 
2020]    PAYING FOR UNAPPROVED MEDICAL PRODUCTS 93 
constitute undue manipulation of research subjects.48 Well-funded 
pharmaceutical companies may cover these ancillary expenses, in-
cluding logistical costs like travel and lodging, as part of the overall 
cost of conducting a clinical trial, but small pharmaceutical and bi-
otechnology companies cover these costs less frequently.49 
In contrast to trials initiated by biopharmaceutical compa-
nies, another category of trials is “investigator-initiated research.”50 
In such cases, where physician-scientists run their own trials, re-
searchers may be able to get the investigational product paid for by 
research funding or donated by its manufacturer, but incidental 
costs are even less likely to be covered.51  
When patients are exposed to trial costs, those expenses may 
prevent patients who would be inclined to participate from doing 
so.52 In the field of oncology, scholars have defined “financial tox-
icity” as the phenomenon of healthcare costs causing stress, bank-
ruptcy, and worse health outcomes for patients.53 Recently, scholars 
have focused this concept on clinical trials in particular, arguing 
that financial exposures may be one reason that clinical trials tend 
to disproportionately enroll whiter and wealthier populations, ex-
cluding those less able to pay trial-related expenses out of pocket.54 
Some patients call upon others to assist with trial-related ex-
penses. A case in point is that of Lily, “a bright and bubbly 13 year 
old” in England, whose family is seeking to enroll her in a United 
States-based clinical trial in Seattle, Washington.55 According to a 
“crowdfunding”—the practice of soliciting a large number of small 
 
 48. Attachment A - Addressing Ethical Concerns Regarding Offers of Payment to Research Par-
ticipants, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp-committee/recommendations/attach-
ment-a-september-30-2019/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 2019). 
 49. Amit Pratap Singh Rathore, Getting a Handle on Clinical Trial Costs, CLINICAL 
LEADER (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.clinicalleader.com/doc/getting-a-handle-on-clinical-
trial-costs-0001. 
 50. R. Romanchuk, The Noble Pursuit of Investigator-Initiated Research, ADVARRA (June 19, 
2019), https://www.advarra.com/investigator-initiated-research. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Clinical Trials for Cancer Patients, GOFUNDME (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.go-
fundme.com/c/blog/clinical-trials-cancer-patients. 
 53. Fumiko Chino & S. Yousuf Zafar, Financial Toxicity and Equitable Access to Clinical 
Trials, 39 ASCO EDUC. BOOK 11 (2019). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Ellis Whitehouse, Lily Wythe Gets 300k in Donations Thanks to One Pound Warriors 
Campaign, ECHONEWS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.echo-news.co.uk/news/18184265.lily-
wythe-gets-300k-donations-thanks-one-pound-warriors-campaign. 
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donations from individuals on the Internet56—campaign estab-
lished for Lily on November 18, 2019, “a years [sic] treatment in the 
US . . . will cost around £300,000. This includes the cost of the trial, 
accommodation, flights and medical treatment she may need while 
she’s there.”57 As a resident of Great Britain, Lily likely would not 
qualify for publicly funded insurance in the United States; thus, it 
would fall to her parents to either obtain private insurance (either 
by purchasing it or via an employer) or to pay for her expenses 
themselves.58 
C. Private Payers 
Based on contracts and policy documents, payers have his-
torically excluded coverage for investigational treatments.59 Insur-
ers typically require data supporting the use of a therapy, and FDA’s 
premarket approval of labeled indications serves as the primary way 
to satisfy that need.60 
Currently, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
have laws or agreements that require private insurers to cover the 
routine costs of clinical trial participation.61 Under the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”), private insurers 
must cover certain trial-related expenses that sponsors do not 
cover.62 The ACA requires group health plans or health insurance 
issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage to 
cover routine costs associated with clinical trial participation if the 
coverage is consistent with what would typically be provided to qual-
ified individuals who are not enrolled in a trial.63 Under the law, 
 
 56. See Snyder & Caufield, infra note 140. See generally Irma Borst et al., From Friend-
funding to Crowdfunding: Relevance of Relationships, Social Media, and Platform Activities to Crowd-
funding Performance, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y. 1396 (2018). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Public or Subsidized Health Insurance, SMALL BUS. MAJORITY, https://healthcover-
ageguide.org/reference-guide/coverage-types/public-or-subsidized-health-insurance (last 
visited May 25, 2020); Amy Fontelle, Buying Private Health Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 16, 
2020), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/pf/08/private-health-insurance.asp. 
 59. Won Bok Lee, Recalibrating “Experimental Treatment Exclusion”: An Empirical Analysis, 
83 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 172–73 (2014). 
 60. Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened Professional 
and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 477 (2009). 
 61. Insurance Coverage of Clinical Trials, AM. SOC’Y OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, 
https://www.asco.org/research-guidelines/clinical-trials/insurance-coverage-clinical-trials 
(last visited May 23, 2020). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8 (2018). 
 63. Id. 
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insurers cannot deny or otherwise alter coverage for a beneficiary 
that is participating in a clinical trial. Further, the ACA prevents in-
surers from denying the beneficiary coverage of routine costs for 
items and services associated with the trial.64 ACA coverage includes 
Phase I, II, III, and IV (post-approval) clinical trials conducted in 
relation to the prevention, detection, or treatment of cancer or 
other life-threatening diseases, in which death is expected without 
an interruption in the course of the disease.65 
D. Medicare 
Medicare, the federal health insurance program for people 
sixty-five and older, younger people with disabilities, and those with 
end-stage renal disease, began covering the routine costs of qualify-
ing clinical trials in 2000.66 Medicare considers “routine costs” to 
comprise all items and services generally available to Medicare ben-
eficiaries that are provided in this context to diagnose, treat, and 
monitor complications arising from participation in clinical trials.67 
Though Medicare will not cover the costs of investigational items 
and services themselves, it will cover items and services typically pro-
vided to beneficiaries absent participation in a clinical trial that are 
associated with the provision of the investigational treatment, in-
tended to monitor or prevent complications, or needed for the 
“necessary and reasonable” care arising from the provision of an 
investigational treatment.68 
Medicare does not cover any item or service that would oth-
erwise be statutorily prohibited.69 For example, Medicare generally 
does not cover long-term nursing care at home; as such, Medicare 
would not cover this service for a patient participating in a clinical 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Medicare Program – General Information, CMS https://www.cms.gov/in-
dex.php/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information/MedicareGenInfo/index (last modi-
fied Nov. 13, 2019); Medicare Clinical Trial Policies, CMS, https://www.cms.gov/Medi-
care/Coverage/ClinicalTrialPolicies/index?redirect=/ClinicalTrialPolicies (last modified 
Mar. 27, 2020). 
 67. National Coverage Determination (NCD) for Routine Costs in Clinical Trials (310.1), CMS 
(July 9, 2007), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/ncd-de-
tails.aspx?NCDId=1&ncdver=2&fromdb=true. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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trial.70 For a clinical trial to qualify for Medicare coverage for par-
ticipant expenses, the investigational intervention must fall under a 
Medicare benefit category; the trial must have “therapeutic intent;” 
and it must enroll patients diagnosed with a disease (i.e., not 
healthy volunteers).71 For a clinical trial to qualify for Medicare cov-
erage, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality must con-
vene a panel with representatives from multiple Department of 
Health and Human Services agencies to develop qualifying criteria 
that will indicate a strong probability that the trial will meet certain 
desirable characteristics.72 These characteristics include the extent 
to which there is available scientific evidence supporting the ra-
tionale for the trial and whether the trial’s primary goal is to test if 
the investigational intervention improves health outcomes.73 Re-
cently, Medicare coverage of clinical trial costs has become more 
difficult to obtain due to increased standards for analyzing the ef-
fectiveness of an investigational intervention.74 
Though Medicare Part A (hospital coverage) and Part B 
(medical coverage) pay for a majority of these costs, beneficiaries 
will likely have to pay some out-of-pocket expenses.75 Co-insurance 
for patients is capped at twenty percent of the Medicare-approved 
amount, and a patient’s Part B deductible may apply.76 
Available data suggests that Medicare expansion of coverage 
for trial-related expenses significantly increased the number of clin-
ical trial participants ages sixty-five and older, which was an in-
tended effect of the policy change.77 However, Medicare beneficiar-
ies that also had supplemental insurance were more likely to 
observe this impact, likely because basic Medicare exposes patients 
to substantial copayments, even on clinical trial expenses.78 
 
 70. Does Medicare Pay for Nursing Homes?, AARP (2020), https://www.aarp.org/ 
health/medicare-qa-tool/current-long-term-nursing-home-coverage. 
 71. See National Coverage Determination (NCD) for Routine Costs in Clinical Trials (310.1), 
supra note 67. 
 72. Medicare Clinical Trial Policies, supra note 66. 
 73. Id. 
 74. James D. Chambers et al., Medicare Is Scrutinizing Evidence More Tightly For National 
Coverage Determinations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 253, 253–60 (2015). 
 75. Clinical Research Studies, MEDICARE, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/clinical-
research-studies (last visited May 23, 2020). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Joseph M. Unger et al., Impact of the Year 2000 Medicare Policy Change on Older Patient 
Enrollment to Cancer Clinical Trial, 24 J. OF CLINICAL ONCOL. 141, 141–44 (2006). 
 78. Id.   
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E. Medicaid 
Unlike Medicare and private insurance, Medicaid is not uni-
formly required to pay for certain types of trial-related expenses.79 
Rather, Medicaid policies with regard to such expenses are cur-
rently left to the discretion of the states.80 Only ten states and the 
District of Columbia cover clinical trial participation costs for Med-
icaid beneficiaries, effectively leaving many Medicaid patients una-
ble to participate in clinical research if at least some costs are not 
covered by the research sponsor.81 Congress has looked at this issue, 
but has not yet passed any legislation. If enacted, the Clinical Treat-
ment Act would guarantee coverage of the routine care costs of clin-
ical trial participation for Medicaid enrollees with a life-threatening 
condition.82 There are a large number of medical entities support-
ing this legislation, including the American Medical Association, 
the American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, Friends of 
Cancer Research, and the American Society of Clinical Oncology.83 
F. Overall 
Despite efforts on the part of many stakeholders to make ac-
cess to clinical trials more equitable, United States trial participants 
are likely to be affluent, white, and male.84 Legal reform is one 
mechanism of change, yet analyses of state coverage policies have 
found mixed results on its impact in clinical trial enrollment.85 An 
analysis of clinical trial enrollment rates between 1996 and 2001 
showed a statistically significant increase in Phase II cancer trial par-
ticipation, but not in Phase III.86 Another analysis found little 
 
 79. Health Insurance Coverage of Clinical Trials, CANCER.NET (Oct. 2018), https:// 
www.cancer.net/research-and-advocacy/clinical-trials/health-insurance-coverage-clinical-
trials. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See Chino & Zafar, supra note 53. 
 82. Clinical Treatment Act, H.R. 913, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 83. Community Endorsement Letter (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.asco.org/sites/new-
www.asco.org/files/content-files/blog-release/pdf/2019-clinical-treatment-act-commu-
nity-support-letter.pdf. 
 84. Natalie Jacewicz, Why Are Health Studies So White?, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 16, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/why-are-health-studies-so-
white/487046. 
 85. See generally Cary P. Gross et al., Cancer Trial Enrollment After State-Mandated Reim-
bursement, 96 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1063 (2004). 
 86. Id. 
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impact of state-mandated insurance coverage on the enrollment of 
National Cancer Institute Community Clinical Oncology Programs, 
a mainly non-academic cohort of hospital and oncology practices 
that aim for community-based recruitment in trials.87 After the pas-
sage of the ACA, insurance coverage for early-phase clinical trials 
increased for those with private insurance, but there was no change 
for Medicare or Medicaid insurance holders, who tend to be less 
affluent.88 According to another study, insurance denials persisted 
in cancer clinical trials in recent years, with 62.7 percent of cancer 
research centers and community-based institutions responding 
that, at least once in 2014, insurance had been denied to patients 
seeking clinical trials.89 
III. EXPANDED ACCESS AND RIGHT TO TRY 
If a patient has exhausted all approved treatment options 
and is not eligible to participate in a clinical trial, there are two 
other pathways in the United States for use of an investigational 
medical product: Expanded Access and Right to Try (which are to-
gether sometimes called, “non-trial preapproval access”).90 Both 
mechanisms allow for a patient, through a physician, to request the 
use of an investigational product from the IND-holder (typically a 
drug company).91 To qualify for either pathway, patients must have 
a serious (under EA) or life-threatening (under EA and RTT) dis-
ease or condition and be ineligible to participate in a clinical trial 
for the product they wish to use.92 However, there are significant 
differences between the two pathways in terms of eligibility, over-
sight, and what type of medical product may be sought.93 For either 
 
 87. Shellie D. Ellis et al., Effect of State-Mandated Insurance Coverage on Accrual to Commu-
nity Cancer Clinical Trials, 33 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 933, 933–38 (2012). 
 88. Kenneth L. Kehl et al., Insurance Clearance for Early-Phase Oncology Clinical Trials 
Following the Affordable Care Act, 23 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 4155, 4161 (2017). 
 89. Christine B. Mackay et al., Insurance Denials for Cancer Clinical Trial Participation 
After the Affordable Care Act Mandate, 123 CANCER 2893, 2893–95 (2017). 
 90. Food and Drug Administration, Expanded Access, https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/public-health-focus/expanded-access; Food and Drug Administration, Right to Try, 
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-other-treatment-op-
tions/right-try; see Carolyn Riley Chapman et al., Oversight of Right‐to‐Try and Expanded Access 
Requests for Off‐Trial Access to Investigational Drugs, 42 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 2 (2020).  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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pathway, ancillary and/or direct costs to use experimental products 
often are the responsibility of the patient. 
A. Expanded Access  
The FDA’s EA pathway, which has existed formally since 
1987, allows for single patients or groups of patients to use unap-
proved investigational treatments outside of clinical trials.94 Single 
patients, via their physician, can request the use of an investiga-
tional product by identifying a product of interest and making a 
request to the company or other entity (e.g., academic) developing 
it.95 If the IND-holder agrees, the FDA reviews the proposed treat-
ment plan for medical feasibility and a favorable risk/benefit ratio 
and ensures that the patient is not eligible to participate in a clinical 
trial.96 The FDA prioritizes clinical trial participation so that patient 
usage of investigational medical products may result, through the 
study, in generalizable knowledge to be used in determining mar-
keting authorization, thereby benefiting future patients.97 While 
the agency may alter the proposal, for example, by adjusting dosage 
or planned safety monitoring, the FDA allows more than ninety-
nine percent of these requests to proceed.98 Except in cases of emer-
gencies, the plan and a consent form must also receive approval by 
an authorized institutional review board (“IRB”) before treatment 
of the patient.99 
In addition to accommodating individual patients, the FDA 
allows sponsors to create cohort expanded access programs, in 
which a larger number of patients (even up to thousands) may re-
ceive an unapproved product.100 As with the individual patient re-
quests, there needs to be determination that the proposed treat-
ment offers a higher chance of benefit than risk; that there are no 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 90.  
 97. Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Overview of FDA’s Expanded Access Program for Investigational 
Drugs, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 177, 177–78 (2017). 
 98. Chapman et al., supra note 90. 
 99. Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Expanded Access of Investigational Drugs: The Experience of the 
Center of Drug Evaluation and Research Over a 10-Year Period, 50 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & 
REG. SCI. 705, 705–9 (2016). 
 100. Kelly McBride Folkers et al., Patient advocacy organizations’ information for patients on 
pre-approval access to investigational treatments, 12 BMC RES. NOTES 1, 1–3 (2019). 
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approved options suitable for these patients; and there is no capa-
bility to participate in a clinical trial.101 
Although patients who receive unapproved medical prod-
ucts via EA are not considered research subjects, and the effort be-
ing made on their behalf is considered therapy rather than re-
search, sponsors must collect safety data and report serious or 
unanticipated adverse events to the FDA.102 There is increasing in-
terest in collecting efficacy or endpoint data from expanded access, 
although the value of this endeavor and how to do it without cross-
ing the line into research remain to be sorted.103 Nevertheless, the 
hope of generating “real world data” for a product—from a wider 
population than that enrolled in the product’s clinical trials—of in-
terest to regulators or payers may incentivize sponsors to offer ex-
panded access. 
Similar to the previously described regulations on charging 
for investigational medical products under an IND for clinical trials, 
sponsors that make their products available through the FDA’s EA 
pathway cannot charge patients a profit; charging is limited to the 
direct costs of manufacturing and shipping the medical product 
and expenses related to monitoring and collecting safety data. 104 
Companies submit these cost calculations to the FDA for review be-
fore they can commence charging.105 
Notwithstanding the legal permissibility of recovering some 
costs, most biopharmaceutical companies that provide investiga-
tional products through EA do so at no cost to the patient.106 Com-
panies are unlikely to charge for investigational products prior to 
regulatory approval, to reduce public scrutiny of the market price, 
which will likely be significantly higher than the direct cost of man-
ufacturing the drug, as revealed by the EA price.107 Yet even free 
provision of drugs can also be problematic. After the approval of 
 
 101. Jarow et al., supra note 99, at 705–6. 
 102. Elena Fountzilas et al., Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs: Balancing Patient 
Safety with Potential Therapeutic Benefits, 27 EXPERT OP. ON INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS 155, 155–
60 (2018). 
 103. Kate Rawson, Expanded Access Data Can Support Approval Decisions, US FDA Says, PINK 
SHEET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://pink.pharmaintelligence.informa.com/ 
PS124296/Expanded-Access-Data-Can-Support-Approval-Decisions-US-FDA-Says. 
 104. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 7–8. 
 105. See generally id. at 7–8. 
 106. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to 
Investigational Drugs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 279, 281 (Jan. 15, 2015). 
 107. Id. 
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Firdapse, a drug used to treat a rare neuromuscular disorder, the 
company set the price at $375,000 annually.108 Senator Bernie Sand-
ers (I-VT) sent a letter to the company asking for its justification for 
the price, as the drug had been available to patients for free via 
EA.109 
Third-parties may sponsor EA programs. WideTrial, a San 
Francisco-based company, announced a program last year in which 
it will sponsor and manage EA programs for treatment use of an 
agent Oncotelic, Inc. is developing.110 The FDA approved Wide-
Trial’s cost recovery program for a cell-based therapy aimed at treat-
ing critical limb ischemia.111 WideTrial collects data from those who 
participate in the EA program and sells back this data to the com-
pany.112 The effect on patient costs could be higher, lower, or the 
same as if the sponsor ran an EA a program itself. 
Such recent efforts to find ways for companies to avoid ab-
sorbing the cost of providing investigational medical products via 
EA have developed due to increased awareness of the divide be-
tween well-capitalized companies that have money to devote to EA-
related expenses and smaller or undercapitalized companies that 
do not. Pharmaceutical giants such as Novartis and Johnson & John-
son have publicly reported that they fulfill the vast majority of EA 
requests they receive, and they do not charge for these products in 
the United States.113 In contrast, many small companies cite ex-
pense as a primary reason for not providing their products via EA.114 
Given this problem, there is renewed interest, among some, in 
 
 108. Letter from Bernie Sanders, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Patrick J. McEnany, President 
and Chief Executive Officer of Catalyst Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/letter-to-catalyst?inline=file. 
 109. See generally id. 
 110. WideTrial Partners with Oncotelic to Bring Expanded Access Platform to Cancer, BIOSPACE 
(Jun. 3, 2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/widetrial-partners-with-oncotelic-to-
bring-expanded-access-platform-to-cancer. 
 111. Pluristem Therapeutics, Inc., U.S. FDA Approves Cost Recovery for PLX-PAD under Ex-
panded Access Program in the Treatment of Critical Limb Ischemia, GLOBENEWSWIRE (Oct. 16, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/10/16/1621762/0/ 
en/U-S-FDA-Approves-Cost-Recovery-for-PLX-PAD-under-Expanded-Access-Program-in-
the-Treatment-of-Critical-Limb-Ischemia.html. 
 112. Chris Rauber, This Man Proposes a Win-Win for Patients and Pharma, BIZ JOURNALS 
(May 31, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/05/31/this-man-
proposes-a-win-win-for-patients-pharma.html.  
 113. Steve Usdin, FDA to Facilitate Access to Unapproved Drugs, BIOCENTURY (Dec. 14, 
2018), https://www.biocentury.com/article/299854/how-fda-plans-to-help-patients-get-ex-
panded-access-to-unapproved-drugs. 
 114. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 4. 
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having insurance companies cover the costs of investigational prod-
ucts used via EA.115 
B. Right to Try 
Enacted in May 2018, the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongi-
ello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017 
sought to streamline access to investigational medical products by 
eliminating FDA review and IRB approval of single patient re-
quests.116 The Right to Try Act—which, rather than replacing EA, 
co-exists with it as another pathway to non-trial access—received sig-
nificant political support from President Donald Trump and Vice 
President Mike Pence.117 The Goldwater Institute, a libertarian or-
ganization, developed the concept and first sought to have RTT 
laws enacted on the state level.118 Indeed, forty-one states now have 
their own versions of these laws, creating complexity across jurisdic-
tions to the extent that federal law does not impliedly preempt 
them.119 
Several patient groups have expressed frustration that larger 
numbers of patients have not gained access to investigational treat-
ments through the federal Right to Try Act.120 Although no central-
ized authoritative accounting exists as of this writing, it appears that 
there have been fewer than ten public reports of patients receiving 
access to an investigational medical product through the federal 
 
 115. Peter J. Pitts, It’s Time to Get Serious About the Economics of Expanded Access, 
STATNEWS (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/01/30/get-serious-econom-
ics-expanded-access. 
 116. See generally Right to Try Act, Pub. L. No. 115-176, § 204, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018). 
 117. Angela LaVito, Trump Signs ‘Right-to-Try’ Allowing Gravely Ill Patients to Bypass FDA 
for Experimental Medicines, CNBC (May 30, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/ 
trump-signs-right-to-try-legislation-on-experimental-medicines.html. 
 118. Zoe Carpenter, The ‘Right-to-Try’ Unproven Pharmaceuticals is a Right-Wing Scheme, 
THE NATION (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-right-to-try-
unproven-pharmaceuticals-is-a-right-wing-scheme. 
 119. Jann Bellamy, “Right to Try” Laws Create Tremendous Legal Uncertainties; FDA Ex-
panded Access Preferable, SCI.-BASED MED. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://sciencebasedmedi-
cine.org/right-to-try-laws-create-tremendous-legal-uncertainties-fda-expanded-access-pref-
erable. 
 120. See generally Nicholas Florko, A Year After Trump Touted ‘Right to Try,’ Patients Still 
Aren’t Getting Treatment, STATNEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.stat-
news.com/2019/01/29/right-to-try-patients-still-arent-getting-treatment. 
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Right to Try Act.121 A number of patients obtained access to one 
product under the Texas Right to Try Act before the passage of the 
federal law.122 In all reported instances to date, it appears the re-
quested product could have been provided under EA, and the ra-
tionale for using RTT is unclear.123 
With regard to costs, the federal RTT statute cites some of 
the same regulations that apply in the EA context, prohibiting com-
panies from charging more than the direct cost of manufacturing a 
drug.124 Yet there are important differences in oversight. The law 
does not specify who pays for experimental therapies, nor does it 
specify which entity ensures that these cost calculations are accu-
rate.125 Thus, patients could bear the costs of paying for the inter-
vention and related costs under RTT. Furthermore, the stated “di-
rect costs” might also be inflated or otherwise adjusted. 
 Most of the forty-one state RTT laws provide that patients may 
incur the cost of using an investigational product.126 However, four 
state RTT laws have odd and worrisome provisions, which not only 
allow insurers to exclude coverage for products obtained via RTT, 
but go further to allow insurers to altogether revoke health insur-
ance coverage for patients undergoing treatment with an experi-
mental therapy.127 Insurance companies can deny coverage for as 
long as six months after the experimental treatment ends.128 These 
provisions could jeopardize health insurance coverage for those 
who receive investigational treatments. 
 
 121. Mike Riggs, Trump’s ‘Right to Try’ Law Has Helped at Least Two People So Far. Give 
Credit Where It’s Due., REASON (Feb. 5, 2019, 10:35 PM), https://rea-
son.com/2019/02/05/give-credit-where-its-due-at-least-one-p. 
 122. Zachary Brennan, Who’s Actually Using ‘Right-To-Try’ Laws? A Texas Oncologist Ex-
plains His Experience, RAPS (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.raps.org/ regulatory-focus™/news-
articles/2017/8/who-s-actually-using-right-to-try-laws-a-texas-oncologist-explains-his-experi-
ence. 
 123. See generally Jen Uscher, Expanded Access and Right to Try: Alternative Paths to Experi-
mental Treatments for Metastatic Breast Cancer, BREASTCANCER (2019), https://www.breast-
cancer.org/symptoms/types/recur_metast/treat_metast/clinical-trials/expanded-access-
and-right-to-try. 
 124. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 36, at 7–8. 
 125. Annalisa Merelli, Who Pays for the “Right to Try” Experimental Medicine?, QUARTZ 
(May 30, 2018), https://qz.com/1292947/under-the-right-to-try-act-who-pays-probably-not-
insurance. 
 126. Lisa Kearns & Alison Bateman-House, Who Stands to Benefit? Right to Try Law Provi-
sions and Implications, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 170, 171 (2017). 
 127. Id. at 172 (discussing Colorado, Connecticut, Oklahoma, and West Virginia). 
 128. Id. 
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Currently, there have not been sufficient numbers of pa-
tients using the RTT pathway to render a description, much less a 
prediction, about whether companies tend to charge or not for 
such access.129 Shortly after the passage of the federal Right to Try 
Act, BrainStorm, a company developing a therapy for ALS called 
NurOwn, announced that it was considering using the federal RTT 
law to provide access to NurOwn, with cost recovery from patients 
or other sources.130 The estimated cost was approximately $300,000 
for individual patients.131 Ultimately, the company decided not to 
provide NurOwn through RTT, with one exception: Matthew Bel-
lina, a patient who lobbied for the federal RTT law and for whom 
the bill is named, received NurOwn for free in early 2019.132 
Finally, there are novel approaches to facilitate funding of 
EA and RTT access. For example, a new contract research organi-
zation called Access Hope (formerly Beacon of Hope) aims to facil-
itate “Right to Try programs, at scale, for the industry.”133 The com-
pany has stated its intentions to provide a stem-cell based product 
to patients in the future.134 Access Hope charges individual patients 
for the cost of an investigational product, while also charging the 
drug company providing the drug a fee for collecting data from the 
RTT program.135 The effect on patient costs could be higher, lower, 
or the same as if the sponsor handled the RTT request itself. Addi-
tionally, proposed model legislation in various states would require 
any insurers that provide coverage and benefits for palliative care 
 
 129. See Arthur L. Caplan & Alison Bateman-House, Should Patients in Need Be Given Ac-
cess to Experimental Drugs?, 16 EXPERT OPINION ON PHARMACOTHERAPY 1275, 1276 (2015). 
 130. Tova Cohen, Exclusive: BrainStorm Will Not Provide ALS Therapy Under U.S. Right to 
Try Act, REUTERS (June 26, 2018, 7:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
brainstorm-cell-als-exclusive/exclusive-brainstorm-will-not-provide-als-therapy-under-u-s-
right-to-try-act-idUSKBN1JM1BE. 
 131. Id.; see also Adam Feurstein, Here Comes the Right-to-try Profiteers. The FDA is Powerless 
to Stop Them, STATNEWS (June 20, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/20/right-to-
try-opportunism. 
 132. Nicholas Florko, Prominent “Right to Try” Advocate is Getting Treatment Under the New 
Law, STATNEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/05/one-right-to-try-
advocate-is-getting-treatment-under-the-new-law. 
 133. Paul Knoepfler, Richard Garr Q&A on His New Right-To-Try Firm Beacon of Hope, THE 
NICHE: KNOEPFLER LAB STEM CELL BLOG (Sept. 12, 2019), https://ip-
scell.com/2019/09/richard-garr-qa-on-right-to-try-firm-beacon-of-hope. 
 134. Beacon of Hope CRO Launches at ALS Association Florida Chapter’s Sixth Annual Hope 
and Help Symposium, CISION PRNEWSWIRE (Sept. 12, 2019, 08:29 AM), https://www.prnews-
wire.com/news-releases/beacon-of-hope-cro-launches-at-als-association-florida-chapters-
sixth-annual-hope-and-help-symposium-300917009.html; Knoepfler, supra note 133. 
 135. Id. 
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to provide coverage and benefits for investigational medical prod-
ucts on a basis no less favorable than that of palliative care or hos-
pice.136 As of this writing, no state legislature has adopted this legis-
lation. 
IV. UNREGULATED SALES 
For a variety of reasons, including a dissatisfaction with allo-
pathic medicine, a perceived lack of approved treatment options, 
or willingness to try any option available, very ill patients and their 
families may wish to access medical interventions marketed and sold 
outside of, or at the margins of, existing regulatory structures.137 
Such options include alternative medical therapies and modalities, 
dietary supplements, and homeopathic and/or naturopathic reme-
dies.138 To access such treatments, patients may resort to “medical 
tourism,” traveling to other locations (sometimes domestic but typ-
ically international) to access medical products or procedures that 
are not locally available to them.139 Regardless of where access oc-
curs, these interventions are typically unproven; however, only 
some are “investigational,” in terms of being rigorously studied for 
efficacy and safety.140 The FDA’s lax regulation of all these products 
means that patients receive injections of various substances that 
have no proof of safety, efficacy, or even that they contain what they 
claim. 
Stem cell treatments are an important example of this di-
rect-to-consumer phenomenon.141 Some stem cell treatments are 
the subject of legitimate clinical trials and medical research.142 On 
 
 136. The Abigail Alliance Patient Advoc. Comm., The Freedom of Treatment Act: Empower-
ing Terminally-Ill Patients to Try Experimental Drugs and Therapies, THE ABIGAIL-ALLIANCE (Jan. 
21, 2020), https://www.abigail-alliance.org/2020/01/freedom-of-treatment-act-empower-
ing-patients.html. 
 137. Jeremy Snyder & Timothy Caulfield, Patients’ Crowdfunding Campaigns for Alterna-
tive Cancer Treatments, 20 THE LANCET 28, 28–9 (2019). 
 138. See Types of Complementary and Alternative Medicine, JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE, 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/wellness-and-prevention/types-of-complemen-
tary-and-alternative-medicine (last visited June 12, 2020). 
 139. See generally I. GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS: MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW, 
AND ETHICS (2014).  
 140. See generally id. 
 141. See Geoffrey P. Lomax, Art Torres, & Maria T. Millan, Regulated, Reliable, and Repu-
table: Protect Patients with Uniform Standards for Stem Cell Treatments, 9 STEM CELLS 
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 547, 547 (2020). 
 142. Id. 
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the other hand, when heavily marketed as miracle treatments, un-
proven stem cell treatments can be a potential public health 
threat.143 Stem cell treatments can cause a multitude of serious ad-
verse events.144  
In general, public and private payers do not cover these 
products or services, which are neither recognized as medically nec-
essary nor supported by an evidentiary basis.145 Instead, patients 
seeking to use these options must pay out-of-pocket. Some patients 
turn to crowdfunding. There is some evidence to suggest that 
crowdfunding campaigns are not funded equitably, and campaign-
ers with greater perceived social media literacy tend to raise more 
money on average than those without; additionally, white cam-
paigners tend to raise more money on average than people of 
color.146 
GoFundMe is the market leader in personal medical fund-
raising online, and its website states that it raises more than $650 
million for over 250,000 medical campaigns per year.147 According 
to GoFundMe’s CEO, one in three of the website’s campaigns in-
volve medical fundraising.148 Many of these campaigns involve bona 
fide medical interventions.149 For example, in a world of uninsur-
ance and underinsurance, patients and families may raise money to 
pay large copays in the event of an emergency or to fund long-term 
care.150 Accordingly, scholars have found states that did not adopt 
 
 143. Laertis Ikonomou et al., Unproven Stem Cell Treatments for Lung Disease-An Emerging 
Public Health Problem, 195 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 13, 13–14 (2017). 
 144. See Amy Zarzeczny et al., The Stem Cell Market and Policy Options: A Call for Clarity, 5 
J. L. BIOSCIENCE 743, 744–5, 753 (2018). 
 145. See Liz Szabo, Why Expensive, Unproven Stem Cell Treatments are a New Health Care 
Trend, PBS (Apr. 4, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/why-expen-
sive-unproven-stem-cell-treatments-are-a-new-health-care-trend. 
 146. Lauren S. Berliner & Nora J. Kenworthy, Producing a Worthy Illness: Personal Crowd-
funding Amidst Financial Crisis, 187 SOC. SCI. & MED. 233, 240 (2017). 
 147. Get Help With Medical Fundraising, GOFUNDME, https://www.go-
fundme.com/start/medical-fundraising (last visited June 12, 2020). 
 148. Mark Zdechlik, Go Fund My Doctor Bills: Americans Ask for Help Paying for Health Care, 
MPR NEWS (July 2, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/07/02/health-
care-gofundme-crowdfunding-doctor-bills-minn. 
 149. Max Levy, Bioethics Experts Call on GoFundMe to Ban Unproven Medical Treatments, 
THE VERGE (Dec. 9, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/12/9/21002593/bi-
oethics-gofundme-health-unproven-medical-treatments-illegal-operations. 
 150. Mark Zdechlik, Patients are Turning to GoFundMe to Fill health Insurance Gaps, NPR 
(Dec. 27, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/12/27/633979867/patients-are-turning-to-gofundme-to-fill-health-insurance-
gaps. 
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Medicaid expansion after the passage of the ACA held a higher 
number of crowdfunding campaigns than those that did adopt the 
expansion.151 
Frequently, however, people use crowdfunding to raise 
money for scientifically unsupported and potentially dangerous 
treatments.152 Between November 2015 and December 2017, more 
than one thousand medical crowdfunding campaigns raised more 
than $6.7 million for a set of five treatments unsupported by scien-
tific evidence: stem cells for brain injury, stem cells for spinal cord 
injury, homeopathy/naturopathy for cancer, hyperbaric oxygen 
therapy for brain injury, and long-term usage of antibiotics for 
Lyme disease.153 Another study investigating stem cell treatments 
marketed by 351 United States-based companies found that 408 
campaigns raised more than one million dollars for these direct-to-
consumer interventions.154 Unscrupulous health care providers 
stand to reap significant financial reward from patient use of crowd-
funding for treatments that at best are ineffective, and at worst po-
tentially harmful. 
V. ETHICAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Individuals and families in the United States purchase 
health insurance so that they can receive financial assistance for 
medical costs. There is a widespread expectation that insurers will 
cover the costs of medicines, items, and services that will cure or 
treat illnesses with the goal of improving one’s quality of life.155 
Many Americans, however, find that their expectations surrounding 
their coverage and what they can afford drastically shift when a pa-
tient or loved one becomes gravely ill.156 In the absence or 
 
 151. Berliner & Kenworthy, supra note 146, at 237. 
 152. Ford Vox et al., Medical Crowdfunding for Scientifically Unsupported or Potentially Dan-
gerous Treatments, 320 JAMA 1705, 1705-6 (2018); see also Jeremy Snyder & Leigh Turner, 
Selling Stem Cell ‘Treatments’ as Research: Prospective Customer Perspectives from Crowdfunding Cam-
paigns, 13 REGENERATIVE MED. 375, 379 (2018). 
 153. Vox et al., supra note 152, at 1705–6. 
 154. Jeremy Snyder et al., Crowdfunding for Unproven Stem Cell-Based Interventions, 319 
JAMA 1935, 1935–6 (2018). 
 155. Jim Parker, Biologics and the Principles of Health Insurance, 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY 
HEALTHCARE 14, 15 (2012). 
 156. Lisa McDermott, How Consumer Expectations Drive Change in Health Organizations, 
CERNER (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.cerner.com/perspectives/consumer-expectations-
are-driving-change-in-health-care-organizations. 
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exhaustion of approved treatment options, seriously or terminally 
ill patients are sometimes surprised or outraged that an insurer will 
not cover a last resort investigational product that may provide ben-
efit.157 We offer both individual-level and population-level bioethics 
policy analyses. 
A. Individualized Bioethics 
It is sometimes tempting for an insurer, sponsor, or policy-
maker—and indeed, the general public—to focus on a particular 
patient’s request for an unapproved treatment rather than focusing 
on broader policy questions.158 Scholars refer to this perspective-
taking as one of “identified” lives rather than “statistical” lives, and 
at least psychologically, such framing seems quite important.159 
Such a focus raises serious equity concerns in that objectively similar 
requests may be treated differently based on how appealing an in-
dividual is perceived to be. Petitions for access often underscore fac-
tors about the requestor that would invoke sympathy, for example, 
their age or the fact that they are newly married or a parent. 
Access to an unapproved product may be framed as a form 
of rescue for a desperate person in crisis or danger, like offering a 
hand to a drowning child in a pond. Through this lens, the moral 
obligation to help seems almost obvious. Of course, it is limited to 
situations where there is medical feasibility, no obvious unaccepta-
ble risks, and a real chance of benefit to a patient.160 Such a “rule of 
rescue”161 is the basic ethical justification that pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies employ when offering non-trial preap-
proval access of their investigational products. However, some com-
panies may decline to grant this kind of access using the justification 
that if they are unable to provide the product to all requestors, then 
it is unfair to provide it only to some. Alternatively, small companies 
may not offer this access if doing so would divert resources from 
 
 157. See Snyder & Turner, supra note 152, at 378. 
 158. I. GLENN COHEN ET AL., IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 1 (2015), https://www.oxfordscholar-
ship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217471.001.0001/acprof-9780190217471. 
 159. See generally id. 
 160. John McKie & Jeff Richardson, The Rule of Rescue, 56 SOC. SCI. MED. 2407, 2407–19 
(2003). 
 161. Id. at 2407. 
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clinical trials and cost them the necessary resources to gather data 
for a regulatory submission.162  
Such morally salient perspectives can also impinge on com-
panies’ rational interests. On the one hand, companies and execu-
tives may face costly public shaming if they choose not to provide a 
product.163 On the other hand, outside well-defined clinical trials, 
the clinical risks of providing the investigational product are possi-
bly greater, and adverse outcomes may cause negative publicity or 
devastating financial losses to the company when those outcomes 
are disclosed to investors.164 There is widespread concern within in-
dustry that non-trial preapproval access related serious adverse 
events will hinder the product’s progress to FDA approval; however, 
the FDA has sought to assuage this concern.165 In a world that de-
pends on drug development by companies, these rational business 
interests are not irrelevant to public health and ethics.  
Even from this individual perspective, there are compelling 
reasons to constrain coverage for unapproved treatments, aside 
from the equity concerns raised above. These reasons arise from the 
principles of non-maleficence and acceptable medical paternalism. 
Just as insurers or sponsors are in a position to potentially help 
those in dire need of rescue, they similarly have an obligation to 
avoid complicity in harming patients who would access dangerous 
products.166 Indeed, the duty not to harm, particularly when there 
is no compensatory benefit, is arguably stronger than the duty to 
offer a potential benefit. How can sponsors or payers be confident 
as to whether intervening will do more good than harm, when the 
majority of investigational medical products ultimately fail?167 
The typical response to these sorts of concerns is to allow the 
patient to decide for herself, whether the intervention is likely to be 
 
 162. See generally id. at 2417. 
 163. Kenneth I. Moch, Ethical Crossroads: Expanded Access, Patient Advocacy, and the 
#SaveJosh Social Media Campaign, MED. ACCESS @ POINT OF CARE e119, e123 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.5301/maapoc.0000019. 
 164. Goldwater Inst., Dead on Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves Little Hope for 
Dying Patients, RIGHTTOTRY (Feb. 24, 2016), https://righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival. 
 165. Food and Drug Administration, Expanded Access | Information for Industry, 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/expanded-access/expanded-access-information-indus-
try#FDAPolicy (“FDA is not aware of instances in which adverse event information from 
expanded access has prevented FDA from approving a drug.”) 
 166. Id. at 1275. 
 167. Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1 An Overview of Approval 
Processes for Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 171 (2016). 
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harmful or beneficial on net. However, where reliable information 
is scant and the choice may be colored by desperation, mere defer-
ence to the patient’s wishes may be unreliable, for guiding the eth-
ical decisions of others, such as companies and insurers. An analo-
gous concern for clinical trials is the “therapeutic misconception,” 
or the misunderstanding by some research participants that the pri-
mary purpose of a clinical trial is to treat them, when it is instead to 
produce generalizable knowledge.168 
To the extent that individuals may have a moral right to ac-
cess some investigational treatments, they also have a right to fair 
procedures in determining the applicability of that right.169 The de-
cisions are both drug-focused and patient-focused. At the drug-
level, private insurers and government health agencies have relied 
on technology assessments summarizing the available evidence and 
gaps in knowledge.170 If an assessment reveals insufficient evidence 
on which decisions can be made, insurers will often deny coverage 
or require additional information.171 Such assessments consume re-
sources that might be better spent elsewhere.172 By choosing not to 
cover investigational therapies as a standard policy, other insurers 
avoid these situations entirely.173 
At the individual level, Aetna and Kaiser Permanente have 
devised a system for external reviews of requests for coverage of in-
vestigational therapies by independent medical consultants.174 In 
the event that they do not recommend coverage, beneficiaries can 
appeal those decisions by requesting that a medical ombudsman 
program, usually a panel of two to three experts who are not affili-
ated with the insurer, make a clinical assessment of the treatment 
plan’s feasibility for an individual patient.175 In 1996, California’s 
legislature passed the Friedman-Knowles Experimental Treatment 
Act, which mandated that all California insurers use a similar 
 
 168. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception: Informed Consent in Psychi-
atric Research, 5 INT’L J. OF L. AND PSYCHIATRY 319 (1982). 
 169. See Caplan & Bateman-House, supra note 129, at 1278. 
 170. Mary Ader, Investigational Treatments: Coverage, Controversy, and Consensus, 5 ANN. 
HEALTH L. 45, 49 (1996). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care Plural-
ism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, 28 HASTINGS CEN. REP. 27, 31–32 (1998). 
 175. Id. at 33. 
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independent consultation process for reviewing coverage denials.176 
These review processes aim to uphold the principle of procedural 
justice by ensuring that patients are treated with transparency and 
fairness when they inquire about or appeal these coverage deci-
sions. 
B. Population-Level Bioethics 
The foregoing analyses do not answer several population-
level questions. Under what, if any, circumstances should coverage 
for preapproval access be further expanded? How can limits be set 
fairly and how can access to unapproved treatments be rationalized 
to plan members who are denied reimbursement of certain approved 
medications? Several of these questions impinge on collective ac-
tion problems. 
Although rationing is sometimes considered a dirty word, it 
is essential in any world of scarce resources.177 In a world of scarcity, 
public and private insurers must set reasonable limits on their cov-
erage of items and services to control the costs of health insurance 
premiums and/or taxes that support coverage in the first place. Al-
location of the common pool resource that is health insurance is an 
important collective action problem, which reflects divergent inter-
ests of individuals paying into the pool ex ante and individuals draw-
ing from the pool ex post.178 
Given the paucity of evidence about their safety and efficacy, 
unapproved products are precisely the category of healthcare ex-
penditures that we can be least confident of securing commensu-
rate value for each dollar spent.179 As frustrating as it may be for a 
desperate patient to be denied access to an unproven treatment, it 
is also frustrating for millions of workers to have their real wages 
depressed for decades as their incomes were instead shifted towards 
health insurance premiums growing at multiples the rate of infla-
tion.180 Even worse, if insurance premiums are inflated by spending 
 
 176. Id. at 34. 
 177. Nir Eyal et al., Can Rationing Through Inconvenience Be Ethical?, 48 HASTINGS CEN. 
REP. 10, 22 (2018). 
 178. Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL L. REV. 1451, 1459, 1484, 1525 
(1994). 
 179. Christopher T. Robertson, The Presumption Against Expensive Health Care Consump-
tion, 49 TULSA L. REV. 627, 636–37 (2014). 
 180. Darren Lubotsky & Craig A. Olson, Premium Copayments and the Trade-Off Between 
Wages and Employer-Provided Health Insurance, 44 J. HEALTH ECON. 63, 64–67 (2015). 
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on unproven treatments, some marginal consumers may be unable 
to get insured at all.181 Using scarce monies to incentivize preap-
proval access is problematic when many lack sufficient access to 
proven basic care. Yet preapproval access to medical problems 
comes in different forms, some of which it may be more justifiable 
than others to incentivize. Thus, the question of paying for preap-
proval access is not a simple yes or no; rather, it is a question of 
which expenses should be prioritized over which other potential ex-
penditures.  
These concerns explain why insurers have traditionally set 
limits on spending, requiring “medical necessity” and excluding in-
vestigational treatments.182 In routine practice, for approved prod-
ucts to be used on-label, medical necessity primarily entails that a 
physician identify the treatment as appropriate care for his or her 
patient, which reflects the teleological purpose of health insurance 
in the first place.183 For off-label or investigational treatments rec-
ommended by a treating physician, the justification for coverage is 
more complicated.184 The product may well prove to be the optimal 
treatment; the evidence for that claim is just not yet available, or at 
least has not yet decisively been reviewed by the FDA, which was 
created for that purpose.185 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to enforce even reasonable limits. 
For example, in the 1990s, high-dose chemotherapy followed by au-
tologous bone marrow transplantation (“HDC-ABMT”) was a treat-
ment for breast cancer, even though it had a weak evidence base.186 
In response to patient protests and some litigation, many plans 
agreed to cover the treatment.187 With the treatment available via 
insurance, patients desiring it did not have incentive to participate 
in clinical trials of the intervention, and so the development of 
 
 181. E. Richard Brown, Problems of Health Insurance Coverage and Health Care in the United 
States: Public and Private Solution Strategies, 8 CAD. SAÚDE PÚBL., RIO DE JANEIRO 270, 271, 
276–78 (1992). 
 182. Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 
140 PENN. L. REV. 1637, 1645–46 (1992). 
 183. Id. at 1647. 
 184. See id. at 1677, 1682. 
 185. See id. at 1665. 
 186. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose Chemother-
apy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101, 101–02 
(2001). 
 187. Ader, supra note 170, at 50–51, 56. 
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evidence was delayed.188 Yet upon completion of these trials, five 
major randomized clinical trials did not show HDC-ABMT to be ef-
fective over standard-dose treatment, and the procedure was ulti-
mately repudiated as ineffective and associated with faster time to 
death.189 That episode caused insurance companies to outline 
clearer policies surrounding coverage of investigational treatments, 
often limiting them to the confines of clinical trials.190  
More recently, when courts have addressed such coverage 
disputes, decisions are often in favor of patients suing for cover-
age.191 For example, in 2018, an Oklahoma jury awarded $25.5 mil-
lion in damages for bad faith insurance denial in a case where a 
cancer patient sought proton beam therapy, which Aetna deter-
mined was investigational or experimental for the patient’s specific 
disease.192 
Broad insurance coverage of investigational therapies has 
additional implications for population health. One issue is the col-
lective action problem in the generation of knowledge about safety 
and efficacy.193 The generation of knowledge requires investment 
(typically by companies) in the costs of performing clinical trials, 
and it requires humans willing to participate in those trials.194 Ac-
cordingly, regulations prohibit companies from profiting from clin-
ical trials, EA, and RTT; such profits would sap their incentive to 
complete the trials necessary to enter the market broadly.195 While 
using scarce monies on unapproved medical products is problem-
atic when many lack sufficient access to proven basic care, such ex-
penditures are justifiable if the investigational products are used in 
such a way to generate societally-beneficial findings. Insurance cov-
erage for investigational therapies given to patients within the con-
text of a clinical trial ensures a sufficient number of individuals will-
ing to participate in studies that evaluate the safety and effectiveness 
 
 188. Id. at 50. 
 189. Mello & Brennan, supra note 186, at 102. 
 190. Ader, supra note 170, at 48, 54. 
 191. Id. at 54; Mello & Brennan, supra note 186, at 113. 
 192. Wayne Drash, Jury Delivers $25.5 million “Statement” to Aetna to Change its Ways, CNN 
(Nov. 10, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/10/health/aetna-verdict-okla-
homa-orrana-cunningham/index.html. 
 193. Robertson, supra note 7, at 562, 565. 
 194. Ahmad W & Moeen Al-Sayed, Human Subjects in Clinical Trials: Ethical Considerations 
and Concerns, 4 J. TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 1, 1–3 (2018). 
 195. Christopher T. Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment Right to Promote 
Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1019, 1020 (2017). 
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of new medical products which could eventually reach the larger 
patient population. Relatedly, insurance coverage of patient uses of 
investigational therapies, particularly in the context of clinical tri-
als, can be a form of subsidy for drug innovation.196 Smaller innova-
tive companies may fail prior to reaching full market approval. If 
costs can be offset to insurers, or even recouped through revenues, 
then such companies may be more sustainable.197 Of course, the 
challenge becomes picking winners and losers; it is not clear which 
companies should or should not be subsidized as such. 
Even outside of trials, insurers could participate in generat-
ing real-world evidence from therapeutic attempts using investiga-
tional products.198 The FDA defines real-world evidence as “clinical 
evidence regarding the usage and potential benefits or risks of a 
medical product derived from analysis of [real-world data].”199 Real-
world data is generally considered to be any source of data outside 
that collected in a traditional, randomized clinical trial.200 Real 
world evidence can support label expansions, particularly when the 
relevant data comes from EA programs, as these may allow sponsors 
to gather valuable safety and efficacy information about investiga-
tional treatments in patients who are different from those in the 
trial population.201 Thus, insurers can support innovation while sim-
ultaneously participating in generating evidence that aids in their 
process of determining which products should be added to their 
formularies. Nonetheless, the collection of real world data from EA 
runs the risk of blurring the previously sacrosanct division of re-
search and treatment and raising challenges concerning appropri-
ate oversight.  
There are also important equity concerns. If an individual 
insurer, whether it be government-run or private, decides to cover 
 
 196. See Shailin Thomas & Arthur Caplan, Incentivizing Therapies for Rare Diseases—Reply, 
322 JAMA 465 (2019). 
 197. Reed Abelson, Cost, Not Choice, is Top Concern of Health Insurance Customers, THE N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/business/cost-not-choice-
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 198. Real-World Evidence, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 5, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/science-research/science-and-research-special-topics/real-world-evi-
dence; Report on Leveraging Real-World Treatment Experience from Expanded Access Protocols, 
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 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
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an investigational therapy based on a particular case determination 
or documented unmet medical need, it must do so in generalizable 
fashion, treating like cases alike.202 It should ensure that all patients, 
regardless of their socioeconomic status, can afford to access this 
therapy in a clinical trial or through a non-trial pathway. This con-
sideration impinges upon broader social questions of underinsur-
ance, but it is necessary here to recognize the irony of the foregoing 
ethical rationales for possibly expanding insurance coverage if done 
in a way that does not guarantee equitable access.203 
C. Looking Ahead 
Given the foregoing ethical and policy concerns, we suggest 
a few ways forward. The goal is to provide a reasonable degree of 
access to promising unapproved treatments, with equity and trans-
parency. 
The most obvious and pressing opportunity for reform is in 
the particular context of clinical trials, where the lack of Medicaid 
coverage for participation costs in many states precludes many low-
income patients from accessing potentially beneficial therapies in a 
clinical trial.204 Similarly, Medicare should be reformed to place a 
cap on out-of-pocket expenses for patients in clinical trials (as well 
as for healthcare more generally). The Medicaid exclusion and un-
capped Medicare out-of-pocket exposure not only undermine ac-
cess but constrict the diversity of clinical trial participants, and thus, 
the external validity of trial results. This problem has negative ram-
ifications not only for patients who are unable to participate in clin-
ical trials that they would otherwise want to enroll into, but also for 
society, as new treatments are developed through the clinical trials 
conducted on such individual volunteers. 
Beyond clinical trials, some have suggested changes to Med-
icaid and Medicare statutes that allow for reimbursement for inves-
tigational therapies.205 Given the challenge of allocating scarce 
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 204. Guidance for Industry, supra note 36, at 3. 
 205. Michael Cipriano, Right to Try Conversation Should be Redirected Toward Reimbursement 
of Unapproved Drugs, Experts Say, PINK SHEET (Jan. 29, 2019), https://pink.pharmaintelli-
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resources, this approach presents extremely difficult line-drawing 
problems. 
A more modest approach would be to create new federal tax 
subsidies to companies, perhaps targeting smaller biotechnology 
companies in particular, to support their capability to create EA 
programs where they believe the evidence and medical need justify 
such. This approach avoids the two perils of allowing broad insur-
ance coverage of unproven treatments and allowing companies to 
profit from unapproved treatments. This approach facilitates the 
creation of EA programs while keeping companies focused on prov-
ing safety and efficacy for broad market access, when insurance re-
imbursement would be appropriate. 
There has also been a suggestion that sponsors develop 
early-stage conversations with payers so that reimbursement is “pre-
approved.”206 Others have suggested allowing companies to profit 
from preapproval sales, but then placing the profits in interest-bear-
ing escrow accounts.207 If the drug is not approved as safe and effec-
tive for the patient’s indication, then insurers can claw back the 
profits.208 If it is approved, they are released.209 One such mecha-
nism under Congressional consideration is the Conditional Ap-
proval Act, which would create a new pathway to FDA approval, sim-
ilar to the current accelerated approval pathway.210 Conditional 
approval would be provisional and would be automatically revoked 
if follow-up trials supplying sufficient proof of safety and efficacy are 
not conducted within a set time period.211 As companies would be 
able to sell their conditionally-approved medical product for a 
profit, they would have an incentive to make it widely available, un-
like with clinical trials or non-trial preapproval access.212 As an ap-
proved product, public and private payers could choose to cover the 
product’s costs, something they are very unlikely to do for products 
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provided via non-trial preapproval access.213 However, simply be-
cause payers could choose to pay does not mean that they neces-
sarily would do so. A further complication is that the company 
would be obliged to continue clinical trials of the product, yet its 
commercial availability could negatively impact enrollment.214 Such 
post-approval trials have already proven difficult for companies to 
complete.215 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Disparities in access may result when costs for access to in-
vestigational medical products fall solely, or even largely, on indi-
viduals. Ultimately, public and private insurers are justified in set-
ting limits on coverage for investigational products. Using scarce 
monies on unapproved medical products of unknown worth is 
problematic when many lack sufficient access to proven basic care 
and inflated premiums cause other welfare tradeoffs. However, it is 
laudable to try to offer rescue in cases of last resort, particularly 
when this can be accomplished in ways that generate societally-use-
ful data, e.g., clinical trials and real world evidence-generating ex-
panded access programs.  
Thus, Congress should consider mechanisms that encour-
age the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry to cover the 
costs associated with clinical trials, including extending Medicaid 
and Medicare coverage of non-investigational product costs ancil-
lary to preapproval access. Secondarily, non-trial pathways may war-
rant additional support, but these reforms must keep in mind the 
fundamental roles and incentives of innovating companies to prove 
safety and efficacy and of insurers to limit coverage to interventions 
with proven value. Finally, such reforms must be carried out in ways 
that avoid negative impacts on patient access to approved treat-
ments or other evidence-based medical interventions. 
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